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ABSTRACT
Of the total global population, at least 14.5% are living on less than 
$1.25 a day, 34% of the females in the least developed countries are 
unable to complete their primary education, and some 805 million 
are believed to be food insecure. To bring these numbers into 
accordance with the Millennium Development Goals, there are at 
least a dozen of different programmes operating around the world. 
Microcredit, being one of those programmes, is considered superior 
to the rest for being the only participatory approach and for being 
general enough to cater for a number of policy interventions. 
Microcredit or credit to the poor is provided under two very different 
mechanisms; the welfarist mechanism and the institutionalist 
mechanism. Each of these mechanisms has its advocates, as well as, 
its critics. The current paper empirically evaluates the two approaches 
in a systematic way. By using purposively collected data from the 
North West Pakistan and vigorous methodologies, we show that 
commercialization of microfinance institutions has indeed shifted 
the focus from either poverty reduction or women’s empowerment. 
Instead, the focus is now on more secure and profitable advances. 
Moreover, we also show that the welfarist approach in eradicating 
poverty and empowering women is superior to the now popular 
financial system approach.
1. Background
The world’s resources are about to touch the magical US$100 trillion mark, but the gloomy 
reality remains that at least 14.5% of the global population are still living on less than $1.25 
a day (World Bank, 2015a). In addition, an overwhelming 34% of the females in the least 
developed countries are unable to complete their primary education (World Bank, 2015b), 
and some 805 million are believed to be food insecure (World Food Programme, 2015). 
The existence of poverty in the global world is nothing new but the realisation that it can 
be eliminated is not old by comparison. Since the last century or so, numerous poverty 
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programmes, the provision of microcredit facilities to the poor is the most recent and unique 
one. Being the only participatory approach, microcredit enables the poor to earn their own 
living essentials by providing them with the missing arm (financial resources) (Littlefield, 
Morduch, & Hashemi, 2003).
Bearing great expectations, the initial wave of the microfinance institutions (MFIs, 
henceforth) followed the poverty lending approach that championed providing credit to 
the rural poor at concessional rates and without the conventional collateral requirements 
(Arun, 2005). A number of success stories appeared in the academic literature soon after 
the introduction and operationalization of the approach (e.g. Imai, Gaiha, Thapa, & Annim, 
2012; Morduch, 1999; Morduch & Haley, 2002; Mosley & Hulme, 1998; Robinson, 2001; 
Zaman, Khilji, Awan, Ali, & Naseem, 2014). As well as being heavily dependent upon grants 
and subsidies, the non-sustainability of such institutions soon surfaced. Coupled with the 
realisation that all the poor need is credit, not cheap credit, the welfarist MFIs soon realised a 
transformation to the so-called financial system approach (Bateman, 2010). The hallmark of 
the financial system approach, claimed by its advocates, is that the missing arm is provided 
to the poor without hurting someone else (Morduch, 2000).
Amongst other things, the sustainability of MFIs requires charging a rate of interest on 
its advances that is high enough to cover all sort of costs. These costs include the cost of 
acquiring funds, administrative costs, and the costs of internalising bad risks. Thus, pur-
suing sustainability, a number of MFIs started charging interest rates that were well above 
the market rate of interest (Helms & Reille, 2004; Miyashita, 2000). No doubt, a higher rate 
of interest on microloans is likely to achieve the goal of sustainability, but this raised more 
serious concerns than sustainability (e.g. Bateman, 2010; Goetz & Gupta, 1996; Hermes & 
Lensink, 2011; Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Kirkpatrick & Maimbo, 2002; Marr, 2004; Mosley, 
2001; Scully, 2004; Simanowitz, 2002). Two of these newly generated concerns have received 
greater attention from academia. The first has to do with the working of the new wave of 
MFIs, i.e. whether the new wave of MFIs works the same way as the old one did to alleviate 
poverty. The second concern is related to the mission drift of MFIs, i.e. the pursuit of profit 
and sustainability might have shifted the attention of MFIs from their original mission of 
targeting poverty and empowering women.
Regarding the first of the two concerns, the trade-off between financial sustainability 
and outreach has been well documented (e.g. Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Simanowitz, 2002). 
Moreover, the neoclassical utility maximisation model implies that household welfare 
can never be improved by charging a higher price for microloans (Khan, Shaorong, & 
Ikramullah, 2015). Regarding the second concern, we find a mixture of empirical findings. 
For example, while Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) have reported evidence 
of mission drift in cross-country analysis, Armendariz and Szafarz (2009) warn that such 
evidence at best describes progressive lending or cross subsidisation but should not be 
considered as evidence of mission drift in itself. Our aim in this paper is to address both of 
these issues in detail, using purposively collected primary data from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
Pakistan. The paper is organised as follows; Section 2 outlines the area profile and the 
sampling methodology used in the study. Section 3 explains the analytical methodology 
that is used to draw inferences regarding the presence of mission drift and impact of MFIs 
on poverty-related indicators in the area. Section 4 presents results of the various models 
while Section 5 concludes. Section 6 is added to discuss some of the policy implications 
of the results.
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2. Design of the study
2.1. Area profile
The survey has been conducted in Dir lower, one of the 25 districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
which is some 124 km away from the provincial capital (i.e. Peshawar) and 260 km away 
from the capital city of Pakistan. The district is spread over 1583 square kilometres and is 
home to some 1.25 million people. Administrative wise, the district is being divided into 
six Tehsils; Adenzai, Balambat, Khall, Lal Qilla, Samarbagh and Temergara. Each Tehsil 
is further divided into various union councils. The district is surrounded by Dir upper to 
the north, Malakand Agency to the south, Swat Valley to the east and Bajawar Agency to 
the west. Table 1 contains some of the socio economic and demographic highlights of the 
district, which are retrieved from the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation fund (2014).
The Pakistan Household Integrated Economic Survey (2011–12) reports the average 
monthly household income of the area in the range of US$5 to US$10 per day. This means 
that the per capita daily income of an average household (the average household size in 
the area is 7.71 according to HIES 2011–12) ranges from US$0.65 to US$1.30. This is some 
poverty by any standard. In addition, the average land holding is hardly enough to construct 
a house, let alone farming to fill the empty stomach of the local inhabitants. This shows the 
living conditions of 43% of the inhabitants (owner cultivators, sharecroppers and contract 
cultivators) of the area.
The six financial institutions in the area do have some products which are either named 
developmental or antipoverty financing. The financial statements of these institutions show 
that there are hardly any customers for these products, thanks to the collateral requirements 
of these banks. The antipoverty Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are providing 
grants and loans as small as US$147. Given the population and the bleak poverty of the 
area, supplemented by the collateral requirements of the financial institutions, the resources 
of the antipoverty NGOs are not sufficient to meet the growing needs. This space is filled 
by non-conventional money lenders, a type of money lending much more exploitative 
than its conventional counterpart. The public in the area are so religious that no one can 
Table 1. highlights of Dir Lower.
source: Pakistan Poverty alleviation Fund (2014).
total population 1240,389
average land holding in hectares 0.03799
Percentage of literate population 44
Percentage of rural population 94
Percentage of female population 50
Percentage of active population (15–64 years) 50
Financial institutions (banks)  6
Development banks  1
nGos working on poverty alleviation  5
Percentage of employed persons in various occupations
Employer  0.52
self-employed (crafts and related trades) 12.92
Wage employee 40.33
Unpaid family workers  1.58
owner cultivators 37.49
sharecroppers  1.85
contract cultivators  3.53
Livestock  1.79
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do business on the basis of usury. Instead the poor masses contact the financially well off 
people, like the Khans, and the feudal in times of emergency. But why would a ‘khan’ or a 
‘feudal’ extend common people a loan facility, particularly if the prospects of returning the 
loan are very gloomy? The truth is that a Khan or a feudal (Landlords) himself would never 
want the people to return their loans. All they want in return is free labour, the so-called 
unpaid family workers, wage employees and share croppers as documented in Table 1.
2.2. Survey profile
The universe of the survey is composed of the six Tehsils of district Dir lower, six financial 
institutions and five NGOs. Of the six financial institutions and five NGOs in the area, only 
two of the financial institutions and two NGOs have a considerable number of clientele 
and hence the rest are removed from the universe. Thus, we have a total of four institutions 
left; Bank of Khyber (BOK), Agriculture Development Bank/Zarai Tarqiati Bank Limited 
(ZTBL), Helping Hand (HH), and Association of Behavioural Knowledge Transformation 
(ABKT). The first two of the four institutions extend micro loans on the basis of interest 
rates, while the last two extend grants-based micro loans.
A list of the applicants, successful and rejected, for microcredit has been obtained from 
all four institutions, which forms the basis for our sampling. The total applicants of the four 
institutions number in the thousands but only 567 of the applicants have been extended 
microcredit in the last five years. Hence, we have randomly added exactly 567 units from 
the rejected applicants to make our sampling frame balanced. This makes the total sam-
pling units 1134. Using Cochran’s (1977) formula for optimal sample size selection with 
α = 1%, and d = 5%, the approximate sample size for the survey is 666. This sample size is 
non-negligible (i.e. the sample size is much greater than 5% of the population), so we have 
used the finite population correction formula, which recommends a sample size of 420. 
Since we use stratified random sampling to select the respondents, we also corrected the 
sample size for the design effect of 1.3 (Henry, 1990; Kalton, 1983). Finally, keeping the 
analytical framework of the study in mind (Halinski & Feldt, 1970; Long & Freese, 2006; 
Miller & Kunce, 1973), the sample size of 568 respondents is decided as optimal for the 
study. Of the 568 respondents, 317 are MFI clients while the rest are the rejected applicants.
3. Analytical methodology
3.1. The behavioural function
To compare the impact of the two types of lending practices of MFI’s on poverty related 
indicators, we utilise the basic neoclassical utility optimisation framework. Consider an 
individual who is both a consumer and a producer at the same time. His utility maximisa-
tion problem can be stated as (Khan et al., 2015);
where x is a consumption vector, y is the production/income vector and p is the input price 
vector. The maximum value function associated with the problem specified in equation (1) 
can be stated as (Khan et al., 2015);
(1)Max{U(x):xg(p, y)}
(2)V (p, y) = Max{U(x):xg(p, y)}
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One of the well-known properties of the indirect utility function specified in equation (2) 
is that if U(x) is continuous and represents locally non-satiated preference relation, then 
V (p, y) is strictly increasing in income (i.e. y) and non-increasing in prices (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, & Green, 1995). The implications of this property on the welfare of the consumer 
are straightforward; that is ‘any relaxation of the consumer’s budget constraint can never 
cause the maximum level of achievable utility to decrease and any tightening of the budget 
constraint can never cause utility to increase’.
The result derived in equation (2) and its associated property has two very important 
implications for antipoverty interventions such as microfinance. The first part of the prop-
erty says that any intervention that increases income (i.e. relaxing the constraint) would 
always increase the welfare of the consumer. The constraint set can be relaxed in a number 
of ways. For example, if the individual has only his raw labour time as an input to produce 
things, then training and skill provision can enhance his productivity and hence relax the 
constraint set. A conventional farmer who only applies the primitive techniques for cul-
tivation can gain in terms of production, if necessary capital is provided to modernise his 
farming. A person who produces raw material or intermediate goods due to non-availability 
of processing resources can be enabled to produce finished goods, if resources are being 
provided. In all of these cases, the increase in income of the consumer should translate into 
better living conditions and a sustainable exit from poverty trap (this effect has been called 
the income augmenting effect by Khan et al., 2015).
The second part of the property says that utility is non-increasing in prices. This is a 
very interesting result because most of the proponents of the so-called financial system 
approach claim the interest insensitivity of microloans (e.g. Ghate, 1992; Helms & Reille, 
2004; Miyashita, 2000; Morduch, 2000; Mustafa, Gill, & Azid, 2000). This can be true, 
according to the property, in only two situations (Khan et al., 2015). The first case has to do 
with a ‘corner solution’, i.e. the case where the consumer completely avoids taking a loan, 
which amounts to no intervention at all. The second possibility is that microloans, in reality, 
are interest insensitive (i.e. a giffen good) as far as participation of the poor is concerned, 
but would definitely decrease the welfare of the consumer. Clearly, both the scenarios are 
unacceptable if the intervention is really meant for poverty reduction (this effect has been 
called the ‘budget tightening effect’ by Khan et al., 2015).
3.2. Econometric specification of the model
To evaluate the two financing moods empirically, all we need to do is to compare the impacts 
of the two on poverty-related indicators. If microloans are really interest insensitive, then 
no matter what the p is, the impact on poverty-related indicators should be the same. 
However, the behavioural model discussed above implies that the budget tightening effects 
of microloans based on the financial system approach is greater than its income augmenting 
effect (Khan et al., 2015) and hence the impact should vary inversely with the p. And if this 
really turns out to be the case, then a higher p is not necessarily explained by the pursuit of 
sustainability or by a greater depth of outreach, but is the result of pursuing higher profits.
Thus, in order to evaluate the two lending approaches of MFIs, we first diagnose the real 
mission of MFIs by correlating various variables with the probability of being a successful 
microcredit applicant. There are various measures of mission drift but the most frequently 
used proxy is the loan size (for example, Cull et al., 2007; Mersland & Strøm, 2010). However, 
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there are serious limitations associated with this measure of mission drift. First, variations 
in loan size may be due to progressive lending or due to cross subsidisation (Armendariz 
& Szafarz, 2009). Second, using loan size as a measure of mission drift assumes that small 
loans are accepted only by the core poor. While differentiating progressive lending or cross 
subsidisation from mission drift is difficult, the assumption of diminishing marginal utility 
of money also seems less practical. Thus, loan size, at best, is a very crude proxy to measure 
mission drift within MFIs.
As an alternative, our dataset allows us to run the following binary regression. The regres-
sion equation specified in equation (3) basically traces out the screening process of the MFIs.
The dependent variable, in the above specification, is the type of the ith respondent (TRi). 
TRi assumes the value of 1 if the ith respondent is a MFI client (i.e. a successful applicant) 
and 0 otherwise (i.e. a rejected applicant). This equation will help us identify the character-
istics amongst the respondents whose applications for loans are likely to be successful. Each 
of the dependent variables has a distinct purpose for inclusion. For example, the first two 
of the dependent variables (i.e. Household total income, TI, and standards of living, SLC) 
relate to the financial position of the respondents and hence are included in the equation 
for whether or not the MFIs stick to their mission. A negative coefficient of both of the 
variables will imply that there is no evidence of mission drift, and vice versa.
A similar type of variable is the female-to-male ratio (FM), which measures whether 
the MFI are promoting women’s empowerment (a positive β3) or not. Although FM is not 
a direct measure of women’s empowerment, it is indeed the most basic measure in the 
area. The remaining two variables, i.e. perceived income risk associated with the occupa-
tion of the respondent (ORR) and average household education (AE) are control variables. 
Occupations of the respondents are classified according to the risk associated with their 
earnings (ORR = 1 for occupations involving some risk in earnings and 0 otherwise) and 
hence a positive coefficient is expected, if the MFIs screen out bad risk applicants. AE is 
included in the above specification to capture the influence of market awareness or skills 
of the respondents in the MFIs’ screening process.
The issue of microcredit impact on poverty-related indicators is addressed in two steps. 
Using the ‘Difference-in-Difference (DID)’ approach (Coleman, 1999), we first estimate 
the following set of equations;
 
where Yi is the impact variable (income of the respondent, total household income, per 
capita household income, total household consumption, per capita household consumption, 
consumption on health, education and food). Xi is a vector of household and individual 
characteristics and Zi is a vector of MFI characteristics. The vector of interest in this model 
is Zi, where a positive vector of estimated coefficients would imply negative correlations 
between various measures of microcredit and poverty.
Then we replace the vector Zi with a dummy variable and estimate the following set of 
equations;
 
(3)TRi = 0 + 1Tli + 2SLCi + 3FMi + 4ORRi + 5AEi + Ui
(4)Yi = 0 + Xii + Zii + Ui
(5)Yi = 0 + Xii + Zii + Ui
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The dummy variable Zi will assume the value of 1 for ZTBL and BOK (MFIs who charge 
an interest rate on their loan), and 0 otherwise (for HH and ABKT). A positive coefficient 
of Zi would imply the interest insensitivity of micro credit and would mean that the new 
financial system approach is as effective in poverty alleviation as the old one.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. MFI screening/mission drift model
The results of the first model, i.e. the MFI screening model or the mission drift model, are 
reported in Table 2. The model is estimated using the logistic regression technique. The 
total number of observations used to estimate this model is 568, amongst which 317 are 
MFI clients while 251 are the rejected applicants. The dependent variable of the model is 
the type of the ith respondent, which can assume either the value of 1 (i.e. MFI client) or 
0 (i.e. otherwise).
The results clearly indicate the presence of mission drift in the area. All the variables 
included in equation (3) to capture the presence of mission drift have the expected sign and 
are also statistically significant at acceptable levels. More specifically, controlling for other 
factors, total household income and standards of living are positively associated with the 
probability of being a successful MFI applicant. The last column of the table reports the odd 
ratio/marginal effects of each of the independent variables on the type of respondent, but 
we are interested only in the direction rather than magnitude of the impact.
Similarly, the female-to-male ratio appears with a negative sign and is statistically sig-
nificant at 8%. This implies that households having a greater number of female members 
are less likely to be successful MFI applicants.
4.2. The impact of MFI business on poverty-related indicators
To trace out the impact of MFI business on poverty-related indicators, we have estimated 
24 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions of the type presented in equation (4). Three 
OLS equations are estimated for each of the eight impact variables, each one has a different 
measure of MFI characteristic, but the set of the remaining explanatory variables is kept the 
same. The Zi vector includes three variables of interest; type of the ith respondent, loan size, 
and period of the ith respondent with the MFIs. Only one of these Zi variables is included 
in each specification while the set of control variables is the same across all specifications. 
Table 2. Results of the mFi screening/mission drift model.
source: authors’ calculation using sPss 16.
Dependent variable: type of the respondent
Covariates Coefficients Standard error Significance Exp (B)
ti 0.000 0.000 0.044 1.000
sLc 0.175 0.073 0.017 1.191
Fm −0.157 0.088 0.073 0.855
oRR −0.111 0.180 0.537 0.895
aE −0.114 0.086 0.187 0.892
constant −0.211 0.474 0.655 0.809
Percentage correct: 59.5  hosmer & Lameshow test:  2 = 7.938 (sig = 0.440)
cox & snell R2: 0.030   nagelkerke R2: 0.041 
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The set of control variables, which are not reported in Table 3, include initial income, age, 
education, sex, occupation, and average working hours of the ith respondent/household. 
The summary results of the 24 OLS equations are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 includes some very interesting results. To save space and avoid unnecessary 
discussion, we will only discuss results that are statistically significant. After controlling 
for the impact of initial income, age, education, sex, occupation and working hours per 
day, the income of the respondents is positively influenced by all three measures of MFIs. 
The case with consumption of food, and health, is similar. While there is no meaningful 
association between total and per capita household income and type of the respondent and 
period with MFI, both the variables are negatively associated with loan size. In effect, the 
negative association between loan size and household total and per capita income preserves 
the purpose of the next model. The average loan size of the two financial institutions offer-
ing microloans is US$2000, while the average loan size of the two NGOs is US$200. Thus, 
in the very short run, paying back a comparatively large amount with mark-up should 
have different behavioural effects than paying back only a small principal amount. This 
is exactly what is implied by the results and confirmed by, although insignificantly, the 
negative relationship between loan size and household total and per capita consumption. 
That is, accidentally, loan size in the above case serves as a proxy for the effects of rate of 
interest on the impact variable. Having negative estimated coefficients implies that the rate 
of interest on microloans is negatively associated with poverty alleviation efforts, an issue 
that is further explored in the next model.
Table 3. impact of mFi on poverty related indicators.
Impact variables
Type of respondent Loan size Period with MFI
Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig.
income of the respondents 4745.994 0.000 0.035 0.000 182.033 0.000
total household income 2491.488 0.103 −0.014 0.098 52.068 0.252
Per capita household income 361.573 0.295 −0.004 0.024 1.526 0.882
Per capita household con-
sumption
837.385 0.337 −0.004 0.481 36.274 0.162
total household consumption 598.467 0.482 −0.004 0.398 25.653 0.312
consumption on food 583.418 0.059 0.004 0.024 29.858 0.001
consumption on education 48.067 0.868 0.001 0.537 4.291 0.618
consumption on health 485.219 0.000 0.002 0.001 13.494 0.000
source: authors’ calculation using sPss 16.
Table 4. how impacts are influenced by the type of mFi.
Impact variables
Type of MFI
Coefficient St. Error t-value Significance
income of the respondents 6728.998 1174.546 5.729 0.000
total household income –9937.118 2167.954 −4.584 0.000
Per capita household income –2171.083 423.289 −5.129 0.000
Per capita household consumption −602.290 294.187 −2.047 0.041
total household consumption –1128.918 1247.378 −.905 0.366
consumption on food 686.650 425.237 1.615 0.107
consumption on education 289.662 140.060 2.068 0.039
consumption on health 511.730 236.006 2.168 0.031
source: authors’ calculation using sPss 16.
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4.3. How impacts are affected by the type of MFI
We next estimate a set of eight regressions specified in equation (5), where the vector Zi 
contains ‘type of MFI’ as a single variable. This is a dummy variable that equals 1 for MFIs 
charging a rate of interest on their loans and 0 otherwise. The set of the impact and explan-
atory variables is the same as in model 2 and the results are given in Table 4. Of the impact 
variables, income of the respondent, total household income and per capita household 
income are all statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the income of the respond-
ent is positively influenced by being a client of an MFI charging an interest rate; the total 
and per capita household income, and the total and per capita household consumption are 
negatively influenced by the type of MFI. While the negative impact of the rate of interest 
on household income and consumption is expected (Khan et al., 2015), the positive rela-
tionship between income of the respondent and type of MFI needs clarification. Perhaps this 
is not the least expected result either, as any transfer of income, irrespective of the mode of 
repayment, should increase the income of the recipient (Bateman, 2010). But what matters 
for the poverty alleviation effort is the trickledown effect of the transfer, which clearly is a 
negative one for microloans based on interest.
 This substantiates the hypothesis proposed by Khan et al. (2015) but what about the 
positive influence of the type of MFI on consumption on education and health? Apparently, 
these results as reported in Table 3 are in sharp contrast to the hypothesis of Khan et al. 
(2015). Of the possible explanations, household education and initial income has already 
been controlled for. A plausible explanation is that a household may be considering con-
sumption on health and education as an investment in the future, which may be determined 
by something other than the type of MFI or household education and initial income. One 
such factor could be the accumulated wealth and other assets. Since clients of the financial 
institutions have already fulfilled the collateral requirements, it seems that those are the 
respondents having more wealth and assets and hence their expenditure on health and 
education is positively associated with their type of MFI. Thus, the apparently positive 
association between consumption on education and health and the type of MFI may be 
due to the fact that the clients of the financial institutions are wealthier than those of the 
NGOs and hence invest more in education and health.
5. Conclusion
This paper examined two of the contemporary controversies related to the dominant prac-
tices of microcredit institutions that aim at poverty alleviation in less developed areas. The 
first controversy has to do with the trade-off between sustainability and the original mission 
of MFIs. The second controversy focuses on the poverty elimination potential of the old 
poverty lending approach versus the new financial system approach. For this purpose, we 
have purposively collected primary data from 568 respondents in North-Western Pakistan 
and analysed the data with up-to-date econometric techniques. The results of the first esti-
mated model show that MFIs hardly cater for their advertised goals in the area. That is, the 
MFIs neither reach the core poor nor do they cater for women’s empowerment in the area.
To compare the old poverty lending approach with the new financial system approach, we 
have first estimated 24 OLS regressions using the total sample of 568 respondents and three 
different measures of MFI characteristics; the type of the respondent, the loan size and the 
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period of the ith respondent with various MFIs. The results show that all three measures of 
the MFI characteristics positively affect the income of the respondent, household consump-
tion on food and consumption on health. However, the loan size is negatively associated 
with total and per capita household income, which may be due to the fact that the budget 
tightening effect of large loans outweighs the income augmenting effect.
Then we estimated a set of eight equations on the reduced sample of 317 respondents, all 
of them are either clients of the financial institutions (extending microloans based on the 
new financial system approach) or of the NGOs (extending microloans based on the old 
poverty lending approach) to know which of the two approaches is superior in alleviating 
poverty. Of all the impact variables, only the income of the respondent and consumption 
on health and education are positively influenced by being a client of the financial institu-
tions, while the rest of the impact variables, most of which capture the trickledown effect 
of microloans, are negatively affected. Since it is the trickledown effect of microloans that 
counts in poverty alleviation, and since consumption on education and health are deter-
mined by things other than being a client of a financial institution, our results show that the 
old poverty lending approach is superior to the new financial system approach in poverty 
alleviation.
6. Policy implications
The findings reported in Section 4 have a number of policy implications for MFIs, govern-
ments and other multinational institutions working for poverty alleviation. In particular, 
the following important findings from the above analysis can help guide the future policy 
discourse with respect to poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment.
•  The probability of becoming a successful MFI applicant increases with income and 
standard of living.
•  Household female-to-male ratio is inversely related to the probability of becoming a 
successful MFI applicant.
•  The income of the respondent, consumption on food, education and health are posi-
tively influenced by being a client of the MFI, irrespective of whether the MFI follows 
the financial lending or poverty lending approach.
•  Household consumption (total and per capita) and income (total and per capita) are 
negatively associated with loan size (as proxy of interest rate in our case) and type of 
MFI (again as a proxy of interest rate).
The findings reported in the first bullet point is the result of the drying off of funds with 
MFIs and the renewed stress on these MFIs to generate funds for themselves. Obviously, 
these MFIs seek to extend safer and profitable loans; respondents making up the core poor 
group may not be ideal for this purpose. The policy implication of this is very clear; that is, if 
MFIs are meant to reduce poverty, then they must be run in the welfarist domain supported 
by subsidies and grants rather than leaving these to the market.
The second finding regarding mission drift is the inverse relationship between household 
female-to-male ratio and the probability of becoming a successful MFI applicant. As already 
hinted at, there could be more direct measures of women’s empowerment (such as the 
contribution of the MFI loan to female income, education, health and nutrition) but those 
are not realistic owing to the restrictions imposed by the local society on females. Thus, as 
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a crude but realistic measure, if MFIs are meant to empower women, they should extend 
loans to households having a larger female-to-male ratio. Unfortunately, this is not the case, 
and MFIs seems to drift from this mission as well. The third important finding highlighted 
above makes it even more desirable for MFIs to extend microloans to households having 
more females than males. This is so because if the MFI cannot lend directly to a female 
client (since female entrepreneurship is rare in the area), and if female education, health and 
nutrition cannot be targeted directly, an indirect way would be to advance credit facilities 
to households having a larger female-to-male ratio. The fruits of this, as is affirmed by the 
third highlighted finding, would be automatically reaped by the female household members.
The final important policy implication of our analysis that is related to the first one is 
provided by the negative association between the trickle down impact of microcredit and 
the rate that is charged by the MFI. As has been discussed elsewhere (Khan et al., 2015), 
charging a higher rate of interest on microloans would either cause the respondent to cease 
taking loans or would substitute more important household consumption to pay back the 
principal and the mark-up. Given this, the financial system approach, at best, can intensify 
the miseries of the poor. Thus, if the MFIs are meant to reduce poverty or any other similar 
goal, then the only way to achieve this goal is through the old poverty lending approach of 
subsidised microcredit.
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